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GETTING 'EM OUT OF CIRCULATION:
DOES INCARCERATION OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS
REDUCE CRIME?
STEVENS H. CLARKE*
INTRODUCTION

The debate concerning penal sanctions has
been waged primarily between two groups: the
"treaters" and the "punishers." 1 The "treaters" argue that prisons are cruel, expensive
and nonrehabilitative. The "treaters" contend
that even if alternative treatments of offenders
provide no greater rehabilitative measures than
prisons, at least they are less cruel and less
costly. While the "punishers" concede that
prisons are usually not rehabilitative, this
group emphasizes the fact that incarceration
prevents at least those crimes which the offender may have committed but for his imprisonment. The "punishers" believe that this interruption of offenders' criminal careers will
2
significantly reduce total crime.
The purpose of this article is to explore the
question of whether, and to what extent, incarceration prevents criminal acts which may
have occured but for the imprisonment of the
offender. More specifically, this article will
focus on the removal or incapacitation aspects
of imprisonment and its effect on the prevention of crime. The removal effect of incarceration should not be confused with either the
deterrent effect or the rehabilitative effect. The
deterrent effect refers to the crime-preventive
effect on the general public of the threat of
punishment which is communicated by the
official policy on the use of incarceration as a
penal sanction. The rehabilitative effect refers
to the effect on post-prison criminality of the
prison experience, including therapeutic treatment while in prison.
It should be noted that while deterrent and
rehabilitative effects of imprisonment can be
positive, negative or zero, the removal effect
* Professor, Institute of Government University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
I Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U.
Ci. L. REv. 631 (1966).

This reasoning assumes of course, that most
offenses are committed by relatively few offenders.
2

can only be positive or zero. Prison experience
can raise or lower the offender's chance of recidivism upon release or leave this chance unchanged. The threat of punishment communicated by incarceration policies may reduce the
chances of criminal acts by others, fail to affect these chances at all or possibly even increase these chances. Since imprisonment restrains inmates from committing crimes during
the period of incarceration, the removal effect
may be either positive or zero depending on
whether the inmate would have committed a
criminal offense iut for his imprisonment.3
It is almost impossible to examine the removal effect of incarceration separate from the
rehabilitative and deterrent effects. In considering the rehabilitative effect, the possiblity of
a positive rehabilitative effect can be discounted since there is little evidence of reduced
recidivism resulting from prison experience.
Questions may arise concerning the negative
rehabilitative effect, however, since there is a
common belief that the destructive effects of
prison life make recidivism the routine course
for most imprisoned offenders. Nevertheless, for
the purposes of this study, the possibility of a
negative rehabilitation effect is not important
since the chief subject of the inquiry is what
the maximum possible increase in crime might
be if the present practice of incarcerating juveniles were ended. If a negative rehabilitative
effect is assumed, estimates of the increase in
crime resulting from a non-incarceration policy
would be lower, not higher.
The relationship between the removal and
deterrent effects is more problematic than that
between the removal and rehabilitative effects.
It may reasonably be assumed that the threat
of incarceration does to some extent deter juveniles as well as adults from committing
3 This definition ignores the crimes which inmates may commit while in prison against other inmates or correctional personnel.
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crimes.4 Removing the threat altogether may
appreciably increase crime not only by removing a deterrent that has been restraining some
potential offenders, but also by suggesting a
more permissive moral standard and thereby
encouraging crime. The latter might be termed
"de-deterrence." By ignoring the deterrent effect and considering just the removal effect of
incarceration, the maximum possible increase
in crime attributable to ending the practice of
incarceration of juveniles might be significantly underestimated. Nevertheless, there is
some justification for dealing with the removal
effect of incaration exclusive of the deterrent
effect. To establish that the removal effect exists, one need only assume a certain probability
of offending during an offender's period of imprisonment. Then, by definition, the removal effect becomes real and measurable. Establishing
the deterrent effect not only requires assuming
that the offender has a certain probability of
offending, but also that the threat of incarceration is communicated in various ways and that
behavior is influenced by the communication.
This makes the deterrent more speculative by
several orders of magnitude than the removal
effect. In sum, it appears almost impossible to
estimate the strength of the deterrent effect.
Therefore, all estimates made of possible
changes in crime in this study are exclusive of
any possible contribution from deterrence or
"de-deterrence."
THE EFFECT OF REMOVING THE MALE
JUVENILE

OFFENDER FROM

SOCIETY

The focus in this paper will be on the
crime-suppressing effect that can be attributed
to current juvenile incarceration practice,
that is, the actual number of juvenile offenders incarcerated and the actual time currently
being spent in secure custody by adjudicated
juvenile offenders. The primary source of information is the data collected by Wolfgang,
Sellin, Figlio, and other University of Pennsylvania researchers in their study of a birth
cohort of 9,945 boys in Philadelphia. 5 All figures are taken from printouts from the birth

4But see M. GOLD, DELINQUENT BEHAVIOR IN
AN AmERICAN CITY 102 (1970).
5M. WOLFGANG, R. FiGIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT

(1972).

cohort data tapes provided by Dr. Robert
Figlio.
In considering what is herein termed the removal effect of incarceration, data on juvenile
rather than adult offenders are used because
data comparable to those of the Philadelphia cohort study presently do not exists for adult offenders. Although no result generalizable to
the adult offender population can be obtained
by it, study of the removal effect with regard
to juveniles seems worthwhile. Apparently, juveniles commit an appreciable amount of serious crime. From the Uniform Crime Report
data for 1972, it can be inferred that 45 per
cent of arrests for Part I offenses were of persons under eighteen. The contribution of
youngsters under eighteen to the total Part I
offenses is probably less then 45 per cent because their chances of being arrested for a
given offense are probably higher than those of
older offenders. If one assumes an arrest-to-offense ratio for juveniles equal to 1.6 times the
overall arrest-to-offense ratio for all ages, the
proportion of Part I offenses attributable to juveniles can be estimated at 28 percent. 6
Although treated separately in our system of
justice, juveniles commit as serious crimes as
adults, and their commitment to correctional
institutions is similar in at least one respect to
imprisonment of adults. It is based partly on the
perceived need to protect society from the
crimes the adjudicated offender might commit
if not imprisoned. The crime-suppressing effect
of institutionalizing juveniles may not be an
official goal of juvenile correction, but it certainly is a consideration among juvenile court
judges and others involved in the juvenile justice system.
The cohort studied by Wolfgang, Sellin
and Figlio consists of all boys (total 9,945)
born in 1945 who resided in the city of Philadelphia at least from their tenth until their
eighteenth birthday. These boys were followed
from age six to age eighteen in the official records of Philadelphia schools, police and courts.
This permitted the isolation of the effects of
age, a factor which is probably more important
in delinquency and criminality than any other
variable except sex. One limitation of the data
is that they relect official, not actual delin6 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN
THE UNITED STATEs-1972 2, 102, 126, 129 (1927).
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quency. This should not be a problem in the
present analysis if it can be assumed that the
ratio of actual juvenile offenses committed to
offenses recorded by the police is relatively stable. Since there is evidence 7 that white and
nonwhite boys differ with regard to the probability that an actual offense will be officially
recorded by the police, figures for whites and
nonwhites will be presented separately and may
provide independent confirmation of a statement about the cohort or indicate its limits of
variation.
"Incarcerated offender," as defined herein,
will refer to a boy in the cohort who has been
committed one or more times to a correctional
institution before reaching eighteen years of
age. The Philadelphia study deals with two
types of offenses: "index offenses" (those involving actual personal injury, theft, damage
to property, or forcible sexual intercourse) and
"nonindex offenses" (all other acts or conditions legally defined and officially recorded as
juvenile offenses). To reduce the ambiguity of
the term "juvenile offense," which includes a
great variety of socially disapproved behavior,
only index offenses will be considered here.
All references to "offenses" should be read
"index offenses," and all figures for seriousness points pertain to seriousness points for
index offenses. In the Philadelphia study, seriousness points were computed based on the extent of personal injury and property loss or
damage using a scoring system developed in an
earlier work of Sellin and Wolfgang.8
INCARCERATED BOYS AS A GRouP: WHAT THE
PHILADELPHIA FIGURES SHow

Of the 9,945 boys in the cohort, only 3,475
have any recorded contact with the Philadelphia police. Of these, 1,802 have a record of an
index offense (the rest being officially nonindex offenders only) ; 946 of the index offenders
are nonwhite and 856 are white. A total of 381
boys have been incarcerated at least once before age eighteen: 300 are nonwhite and
eighty-one are white. Assuming that almost all
T.
(1969).

HIRSCHI, CAUSES

OF DELINQUENCY

75-81

8T. SELLiN & M. WOLFGANG, THE MEASUREMENT OF DELINQUENcY 401-12 (1964). In the co-

hort study, the Wolfgang-Sellin score was appar.ently multiplied by 100 in all instances.
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the incarcerated boys are index offenders, they
constitute about 21 per cent of the 1,802 index
offenders in the cohort. They account for 41
per cent of all index seriousness points attributed to the cohort, and for 39 per cent of all
index offenses. The 300 nonwhite incarcerated
boys constitute 32 per cent of the 946 nonwhite
index offenders, they have committed 51 per
cent of all index offenses attributed to nonwhites, and have amassed 52 per cent of the
total of index seriousness points attributed to
nonwhites in the cohort. The eighty-one white
incarcerated boys are 9 per cent of all white
index offenders. They have committed 18 per
cent of all white index offenses and have accumulated 19 per cent of all index offense
seriousness points attributed to whites in the
cohort. As expected, the incarcerated boys have
been responsible for a disproportionately large
number of index offenses and seriousness points.
This is true independently of other obvious
differences between white and nonwhite boys
in the cohort.
Comparing incarcerated boys with other
index offenders, it was found that although
the average number of serious points per index
offense is about the same for incarcerated boys
(270 points per index offense for nonwhites
and 256 for whites) as for all index offenders
as a group (265 points per index offense for
nonwhites and 243 for whites), 9 the number of
index offenses per boy is much higher for the
incarcerated group (4.12 for nonwhites, 3.14
for whites) than for index offenders in general
(2.55 for nonwhites, 1.64 for whites). Recidivism, in the sense of a repeat commitment, was
quite high among the incarcerated boys. Nonwhites averaged 1.79 commitments and whites
averaged 1.42 commitments.
ASSUMPTIONS AND ESTIMATING PROCEDURES
It has been seen that the incarcerated boys
constitute a group quite different in offensivity
from the rest of the cohort and even from the
rest of the index offenders. Although the incarcerated boys undoubtedly differ among themselves, the assumption will be made here that
at any given year of age, they are a homogeneous group with respect to offenses commit9 WOLFGANG,

111.

FIGLIO & SELLIx,

supra note 5 at
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ted. Taking the incarcerated boys as a group,
it is clear that not all were in juvenile correctional institutions at the same time. It will be
assumed that, in any given year of age, the
incarcerated boys who were actually confined in
correctional institutions at that age would have
committed the same average number of index
offenses of the same average seriousness as the
incarcerated boys who were not institutionalized during that year of age. The term of
commitment to a correctional institution is assumed to be an average of nine months for all
age groups.' o Obviously, any estimate of the
reduction of juvenile offenses due to confinement in correctional institutions is a linear
function of the mean length of confinement, and
the conclusions reached here are quite sensitive
to changes in that mean.
The Philadelphia cohort is assumed to be
representative of boys generally in the United
States at the present time, and the law enforcemen and juvenile court practices applied to
them are assumed to be generally typical of
those in the United States. It will also be
assumed that statements about proportional
relationships with regard to officially recorded
juvenile offenses hold true with regard to actual
juvenile offenses.
The figures in the tables that follow require
some explanation. In each table, column 1 indicates the number of boys incarcerated at each
age from six through seventeen. Column 2 provides the "full-year equivalents at large" for
each age year. This figure is equal to the total
number of incarcerated boys (300 for nonwhites, 81 for whites), minus the number actually incarcerated at that age, multiplied by
0.75 years, the assumed mean length of confinement. Column 3 shows the number of seriousness points accumulated for each age year
by the incarcerated boys who remained at
large that year. Dividing column 3 by column
2 gives column 4, the points per boy (full-year
equivalent) at large. Column 5 indicates the
estimate of index offense seriousness points
"prevented" by the incarcerations at each year
of age. Points prevented is equal to number
incarcerated at each age multiplied by 0.75
10 The figure of nine months is an estimate provided by Robert H. Sobolevitch, Director of the
Divison of Youth Services, Pennsylvania Department of Welfare.

multiplied by points per boy at large at that
age (column 4). Column 6 contains, for each
age year, the points prevented per incarceration,
derived by dividing points prevented (column 5)
by number of incarcerations (column 1). Columns 7, 8, 9, and 10 deal with index offenses
rather than seriousness points, but are otherwise the same as columns 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Discussiox

OF THE DATA

At first, it is noted that the age distribution
of points and offenses per boy at large is similar for both nonwhites and whites. It peaks at
age sixteen for nonwhites and at fifteen for
whites and then drops off sharply.:" The distribution of incarcerations follows a similar age
distribution. The more offenses that are committed, the more likely a boy is to be apprehended and incarcerated. Approaching the
peak age, the number of points and offenses
preveited per incarceration climbs very rapidly,
then drops off past the peak. The total points
and offenses prevented (columns 5 and 9) is.
negligible until age twelve, then rises very rapidly and drops off sharply past the peak age.
It is assumed that the marginal cost of a
nine-month incarceration is about $1100. This
figure includes four dollars per day for food,
medicine, laundry and other variable costs, but
does not include correctional personnel costs
and costs of law enforcement and juvenile
courts. Considering just the removal effect of
juvenile incarceration, the "return" in terms of
offenses prevented by an incarceration averages
between 0.56 and 0.65 index offenses (these
being the figures for whites and nonwhites, respectively), and reaches a maximum of between 0.88 and 0.99-nearly one index offense
prevented at a cost conservatively estimated at
$1100. Thus, incarceration seems an expensive
"'This finding is generally consistent with the
cohort study, WOLFGANG, FIGLIo, & SELLIN, supra

note 5, at 112, and two studies using self-report
rather than official data. M. GOLD, DELINQUENT
BEHAVIOR IN AN AMERICAN CITY 66-72

(1970)

(sample from Flint, Michigan); Williams & Gold,
From Delinquent Behavior to Official Delinquency,
20 SocrA.
PRoBLEMs 215-17 (1972)
(national
sample).
The Williams and Gold study considered ages
thirteen through sixteen years only. The Gold
study speculated that the drop after age sixteen
may be the result of the tendency of police not to
keep records of youngsters for offenses committed
when they are close to the juvenile age limit.
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STEVENS H. CLARKE
way of preventing crime, although it may be
2
less expensive than other preventive policies.'
Assuming the Philadelphia boys are typical
incarcerated male juveniles, the total seriousness
points and total index offenses prevented by
their incarceration (columns 5 and 9) can be
interpreted either as the maximum increase in
crime that would result from a policy of not
committing juveniles to correctional institutions
or as the maximum reduction in crime that
would result from a policy of doubling the
present age-specific incarceration rates for
juveniles. The number of points and offenses
prevented is quite appreciable in terms of all
juvenile offenses, but not in terms of reported
crime as a whole. For nonwhites in the cohort,
the offenses prevented by incarceration represented a potential number of index seriousness
points equal to 17 per cent of the cohort total,
and a potential number of index offenses equal
to 14 per cent of the cohort total. For white
boys, the points prevented and the offenses
prevented each constituted a potential 5 per
cent of the respective cohort totals. Assuming
that the truth lies somewhere in between the figures for whites and nonwhites, it can be estimated that index offenses actually committed
by as well as officially attributed to, boys under
eighteen would increase by 5 to 15 per cent if
a non-incarceration policy were adopted.
In order to estimate the proportion of all
index offenses attributable to those under
eighteen, it is first necessary to deal with the
question of offenses committed by girls. The
Philadelphia data are of little value here, since
they concern boys only. The contribution of girls
to the total juvenile offenses probably constitutes less than 18 per cent, based on 1972 Uniform Crime Report data indicating that of all
those arrested for Part I offenses (regardless
of age), 18 per cent are female. It may be true
that girls who are committed to training
schools are less likely than boys to have been
committed for index offenses and more likely to
have been committed for nonindex offenses such
as running away from home, incorrigibilty and
truancy. If so, it may also be true that incarcera12 A recent study estimates $35.000 as the cost
of deterring one felony by increasing police patrols
in New York City Subways. J. M. Chaiken, The
Impact of Police Activity on Crime: Robberies on
the New York City Subway System, RAND Institute (1974).
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tion of juvenile girls prevents (in the removal
effect sense) fewer index offenses than incarceration of boys, since the incarcerated girls
have less serious careers of offending. Nevertheless, since the contribution of girls to index
offenses is rather small, it will be assumed here
that incarceration of girls under eighteen has
the same removal effect as that of boys, which
as shown earlier can be estimated at 5 to 15 per
cent of the total index offenses committed by
juveniles.
Since the Federal Bureau of Investigation
does not report on "index offenses" as defined
herein, the category of Part I offenses will be
assumed to be roughly equivalent to that of
index offenses. Part I offenses include all
assault offenses except simple assault, and all
robbery, burglary and larceny. (The chief difference between -the Wolfgang-Sellin index
offenses and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Part I offenses seems to be that the latter
include attempted offenses and other instances
of legally defined offenses where no actual injury or loss of property occurred.)
Using Part I offenses as the equivalent of
index offenses, and using the Uniform crime
Report data discussed earlier, it can be estimated that approximately 28 per cent of all actual index offenses are committed by persons
under eighteen. If the index offenses prevented
by the removal effect of juvenile incarceration
amount to 5 to 15 per cent of those that actually occurred, it can be estimated (ignoring
deterrent effect considerations) that the index
offense increase that could be expected from instituting a policy of not incarcerating any juveniles would be approximately 5 to 15 percent of
28 per cent. This would be 1 to 4 per cent of
all index crimes now committed. The expected
increase in index offense seriousness points
(in harm done by index offenses) would probably be about the same since the figures for
points generally follow the figures for offenses.
This expected increase in crime would be easily
obscured by the effects of other variables on
crime statistics.
The question remains concerning the effect
of removing the threat of training school on
youngsters' willingness to commit crimes. If
there were an increase in juvenile crime due
to weakening of this deterrent effect, it may be
assumed that this increase would be gradual and
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delayed, and not felt to its fullest extent until
several years after the adoption of an nonincarceration policy. If this were the case, there
are ways in which juvenile offending could be
monitored to determine whether there were an
unacceptable increase. If there were an unacceptable increase, it would be possible to return
to the prior policy on incarceration of juvenile
offenders.
The results of this analysis also have implications for a law enforcement strategy based on

the removal effect as far as juvenile offenders
are concerned. Even if it were possible to double
the numbers of juvenile offenders incarcerated,13 the above figures suggest that the
resulting decrease in nationwide index offenses
would be only 1 to 4 per cent. Considering the
problems involved, the benefit is not worth the
cost.
13 The improvement might be achieved by improving investigation and apprehension efforts, by
better prosecution of juvenile cases, and by enacting stricter juvenile legislation.

